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Surviving Enhanced Judicial Scrutiny of
Directors' DecisionsReaching the Protection of the Business

Judgment Rule
ParamountCommunications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the merger and acquisition craze of the 1980's, it became increasingly
apparent that shareholders needed protection from directors who were not
always acting in the best interests of the corporation. Due to the presumptions
raised under the business judgment rule, it was difficult to question the
decisions of the directors. Therefore, in a line of cases from 1984 to present,
Delaware courts have utilized an "enhanced judicial scrutiny" doctrine which
creates threshold conditions for directors to meet before protection under the
business judgment rule can be claimed.
This note traces the history of the enhanced judicial scrutiny doctrine and
explores the difficulty boards of directors face in characterizing and analyzing
the myriad of transactions and events which may occur in a merger or sale
scenario. Then, possible courses of action such boards may take to protect
themselves are discussed.
H. FACTS AND HOLDING
Paramount, a Delaware corporation headquartered in New York City,
2
owns and operates a diverse group of entertainmentbusinesses. The majority
of Paramount's stock is publicly held and traded
Viacom is a Delaware corporation with its principal offices in
Massachusetts.4 Control of the company rests with Sumner Redstone, who
owns a majority of its voting and non-voting stock.5 Viacom controls a wide
6
range of entertainment operations, including cable television channels.

1. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993) (hereinafter ParamountI).
2. Id. at 37.
3. Id.

4. Id. at 38.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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QVC, also a Delaware corporation, is headquartered in Pennsylvania.'
Barry Diller, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, is a substantial
stockholder in the corporation, along with several other large stockholders.'
QVC owns a cable television shopping channel. 9
In the late 1980's, Paramount began investigating the possibility of
expanding by acquisition or merger with other entertainment-related
entities. 10 In 1989, Paramount made an unsuccessful offer to buy Time,
Inc." Paramount continued its efforts of strategic expansion, and in 1993
2
it began to explore a possible affiliation with Viacom.1
In September 1993, Paramount's board of directors approved a merger
agreement with Viacom. 3 The deal provided that for each share of
Paramount stock, the Paramount shareholder would receive 0.10 shares of
Viacom Class A voting stock, 0.90 shares of Viacom Class B non-voting
stock, and $9.10 in cash. 4 If the merger was completed, the combined
corporation would be controlled by Viacom's Mr. Redstone, who would end
up owning a majority of the combined company's stock. 5 The proposed
agreement also contained a number of defensive measures designed to
discourage competing bids from other companies. Three of these measures
were: a "no-shop" provision, a Termination Fee, and Stock Option
Agreement. 6
Under the no-shop provision, Paramount's board agreed not to solicit,
negotiate, or bargain with any other parties interested in making a competing
bid, subject to some conditions.'
Under the Termination Fee Provision,
Viacom would receive a $100 million fee if, due to some action by
Paramount's board or shareholders, the deal was not consummated.'" Under
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. See also Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140
(Del. 1990) (hereinafter Time-Warner).
12. ParamountH, 637 A.2d at 38.
13. Id. at 39.

14. Id.
15. QVCNetworkv. Paramount CommunicationsInc., 635 A.2d 1245,1251 (Del.
Ch. 1993) (hereinafter Paramount1).
16. ParamountH, 637 A.2d at 39.
17. Id. For instance, the board agreed not to solicit, encourage, discuss, negotiate,
or endorse any competing offers unless (1) "a third party 'makes an unsolicitedwritten,
bona fide proposal, which is not subject to any material contingencies relating to
financing"' Id.; and, (2) the board determines that contact with the third party is
necessary to satisfy its fiduciary duties.
18. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/5
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the Stock Option Agreement, which is also called a stock-option lockup,
Viacom had the right to buy 19.9% of Paramount's stock at a predetermined
price if any of the triggering events under the Termination Fee provision
occurred. 19 In addition, the stock-option lockup had two provisions not
customarily contained in such agreements: (1) Viacom could purchase the
stock with a note of questionable marketability" instead of cash; and, (2) if
Viacom so desired, it could purchase the stock with cash at a price equal to
the difference between the fair market value of Paramount's stock and the
predetermined stock price. 2 These two additional provisions, needless to
say, were highly beneficial to Viacom.22
After the deal was announced to the public, QVC began to court
Paramount in the hopes of acquiring it. On September 20, 1993, QVC made
a bid of $80 per share for Paramount's stock, and expressed its desire to meet
with Paramount's board and negotiate the details of a possible buy-out.'
Paramount's board, concemedwith violating the no-shop provision, asked for,
and received, additional information regarding the financing of QVC's bid.24
Satisfied that the no-shop provision would not be violated, the board began
negotiations with QVC; however, negotiations proceeded very slowly.'
On October 21, 1993, QVC publicly 'announced an offer to buy
controlling interest in Paramount by paying $80 per share.26 In addition,
QVC filed a suit with the Court of Chancery of Delaware requesting an
injunction barring the Paramount/QVC merger, as well as requesting the
invalidation of the Stock Option Agreement, worth over $200 million at that
point.'
At this point, Viacom realized it would have to revise its bid in order to
compete. Therefore, Viacom began to negotiate with Paramount in order to
revise its earlier agreement.28 On October 24, 1993, an amended agreement
was approved in which Viacom increased its offer to $80 per share, but left
intact the defensive provisions of the earlier agreement.29
QVC continued to press Paramount by requesting guidelines calling for
a "fair bidding process" which were rejected by Paramount because "auction

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Commonly known as "junk bonds".
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39-40.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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procedures" were contrary to its agreement with Viacom. ° On November
6, Viacom made a sweetened bid of $85 per share.31 QVC responded on
November 12 by raising its offer to $90 per share. 2 On November 15, the
Paramount board decided that the QVC offer was not acceptable because it
Importantly, Paramount did not
was "excessively conditional."33
communicate with QVC regarding the details of the conditions because it
believed that the no-shop provision precluded any negotiation on its part. 4
After this final rejection, QVC continued its fight in court.
QVC's position was that the Paramount board breached its fiduciary duty
in three major ways: (1) once the board agreed to a transaction involving a
change of control from Paramount's public stockholders to Sumner Redstone,
it became subject to duties articulated in Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings,Inc.,3 5 which require the board to obtain the highest possible value
for the shareholders without creating obstacles hindering that goal;36 (2) the
board failed to exercise its fiduciary duty of due care to adequately consider
all of the information available and did not adequately inform itself before
making a decision;3 7 and (3) the board failed the reasonableness standard
under the enhanced scrutiny doctrine mandated by Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co." QVC argued that its offers could not be construed as threats
to Paramount and its stockholders 9 In the alternative, QVC asserted that
even if its offers were a threat, Paramount's response was unreasonable.4"

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 41.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
Paramnountl,635 A.2d at 1261.

37. Id.

38. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). "Unocalrequiresthat the directors demonstrate
that they reasonably perceived QVC's proposal as representing a threat to corporate
policy and effectiveness, and that the measures they took inresponse were reasonable
and proportionate in relation to that threat." Paramnountl, 635 A.2d at 1262.
39. Paranountl,635 A.2d at 1262.
40. Id. Paramount responded by implementing a Termination Fee and a StockOption Lockup. A $100 million Termination Fee would be paid to Viacom if: "(a)
Paramount terminated the Original Merger Agreement because of a competing

transaction; (b) Paramount's stockholders did not approve the merger; or (c) the
Paramount Board recommended a competing transaction." ParamountII, 637 A.2d
at 39. The Stock Option Agreement "granted to Viacom an option to purchase

approximately 19.9 percent (23,699,000 shares) of Paramount's outstanding common
stock at $69.14 per share if any of the triggering events for the Termination Fee
occurred." Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/5
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Paramount disputed QVC's allegations, insisting that the board exercised
diligent due care and was fully informed at all times.4" They argued that the

transaction with Viacom was more advantageous to Paramount than QVC's
offer for several reasons, even though QVC's offer looked more valuable on
its face.42 First, Viacom had many entertainment companies which,
combined with Paramount's several companies, would offer the combined
company many growth opportunities.43 QVC, with only its Home Shopping
Program, could not offer the same opportunities for growth." Second, a
combined Paramount/QVC company would consist primarily of Paramount
assets, which could not generate enough income to sustain the $90 acquisition
price.45 Third, much of the deal was on the "back end" of the merger,
depending upon the value of the stock of QVC at the time of the merger,
which was too closely tied to market perceptions of Mr. Diller and QVC's
prospects of acquiring Paramount.46 Fourth, QVC had placed too many
conditions on the deal to which Paramount had no control.4' Therefore,
Paramount's board contended that it was reasonable for them to reject QVC's
offer, and that their use of the defensive provisions in their agreement with
Viacom were reasonable as well.48
The Court of Chancery held that due to the proposed change of control,
Paramount's board was subject to enhancedjudicial scrutiny under the Revlon
doctrine.49 In addition, the court found that the board breached its fiduciary
duties of due care and diligence by failing to fully inform itself before making
a decision.5" Finally, since fiduciary duties were breached, the board could
not utilize its "poison pill" or other defensive antitakover provisions.5
Upon appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Order of the
Court of Chancery.52

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Paramountl,635 A.2d at 1262.
Id. at 1263.
Id.
Id.
Id.

46. Id.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1266.
50. Id. at 1269.

51. Id. at 1270.
52. ParamountII, 637 A.2d at 51.
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Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since the acquisition and merger boom of the 1980's, Delaware courts
have increasingly been asked to define and refme the fiduciary duties of
directors in the consideration of merger transactions. Following is a summary
of the history of the evolution of the "enhanced judicial scrutiny" doctrine,
showing how the fiduciary obligations of directors have grown since the early
1980's.
A. Aronson v. Lewis 3
Normally, directors making business decisions rely on the business
judgment rule to protect them from liability. The rule is a presumption that
directors of a corporation make business decisions in good faith and in the
honest belief that decisions are made with the best interests of the corporation
in mind. 4 When the presumption holds true, the court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the directors.
However, Aronson indicated that at least two conditions must be met
before directors could claim protection under the business judgment rule."
First, the protections of the rule can only be utilized by "disinterested directors
whose conduct otherwise meets the test of business judgment."" The second
and most important condition is that the directors must fully inform
themselves of all material information reasonably available before making a
decision.57 This becomes important in the analysis the court uses in later
cases. If the directors do not meet these "preconditions," then the actions of
the board do not fall under the business judgment rule, and judicial scrutiny
of the decision will result.
B. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.' 8
Unocal adds to the preconditions elucidated in Aronson that must be met
before directors can claim any protection under the business judgment rule.
While Aronson involved a shareholder derivative suit, Unocal came about in
a change of control context. Mesa Petroleum, a minority shareholder, made
a hostile tender offer for Unocal's stock.59 Unocal's directors rejected the

53. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 812.
Id.
Id.
Id.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
Id. at 949.
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offer as inadequate and, as a defensive tactic, decided to effect a self-tender
offer for the corporation's own shares.6" The directors argued that their
actions came under the business judgment rule because they acted in good
faith, on an informed basis, and used due care.61 The court opined that when
change in control of a corporation is threatened, a board is likely to act
primarily in its own interests in lieu of the corporation's. Therefore, "there
is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold
'
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."62
Specifically, directors facing this situation must meet two additional
conditions: (1) they must prove that is was reasonable for them to believe
there was a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness; and, (2) the
defensive measure must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.6' If the
directors meet this threshold, then they will enjoy the protection of the
business judgment rule.' Interestingly, the court ruled that the directors
could consider the impact of their decision on "constituencies" other than
shareholders.6" The importance of this decision for a board is that it does
not have to necessarily accept a "great" buyout offer; it can consider
preserving the corporate culture and autonomy as more important than "selling
out."
From a practical standpoint, in situations where control of a corporation
is at stake, Unocal sets out a reformulated business judgment rule for boards
of directors.66 Directors now bear the burden of proof to show grounds for
reasonable belief that danger to corporate effectiveness existed, and the
defensive measures they employed were reasonable to the threat posed.67
Once met, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff under the traditional business
judgment rule to prove that the board of directors failed to properly exercise
its fiduciary duty. 8

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 950.
Id. at 953.
Id. at 954.
Id. at 955.
Id.
These include "creditors, customers, employees, and.., the community". Id.
Richard C. Brown, The Role Of The CourtIn Hostile Takeovers, 93 DICK.

LAw. REv. 195, 241 (1989).
67. Id. at 240.
68. Id. at 241.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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C. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc.

In this case, the Delaware Supreme Court utilized enhanced judicial
scrutiny in yet another situation: Acquisition of a corporation (Revlon)
through an active bidding process by more than one suitor. Faced with a
hostile takeover attempt by Pantry Pride (owned by MacAndrews), Revlon
instituted certain defensive measures." When Pantry Pride continued its
hostile efforts, Revlon began looking for a new suitor, finally negotiating a
sale to another company.7 In holding that this defensive measure violated
the fiduciary duties of the directors, the court indicated that once the sale of
the corporation became inevitable, responsibilities of the directors shifted from
the preservation of the corporation as an entity to the duty to obtain the
highest possible price for the shareholders.7 2 In similar instances, directors
can consider only the interests of the shareholders, (concern for other
constituencies became irrelevant), and their only goal can be to gain the
highest possible price in the sale of the corporation. This differed from
Unocal in that trying to preserve the corporate entity is no longer an option
in a sale; achieving the highest price is the only option. Anything to the
contrary would invite enhancedjudicial scrutiny. Again, if the directors could
satisfy this threshold requirement, they would be protected by the business
judgment rule.7'
In effect, the Revlon court "applied the Unocal standard in a more
rigorous manner that was distinguishable from the traditional business
judgment rule."74
Subsequent court decisions refined the Unocal/Revlon conditions in
different contexts and factual situations.75 One question which still remained:
how did Unocal and Revlon fit together?

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1989).
Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 176-78.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 184.
Melissa M. Kurp, CorporateTakeover Defenses After QVC: Can Target

BoardsPreventHostileTender Offers Without Breaching Their FiduciaryDuties?, 26
Loy. U. CHL L.J. 29, 38 (1994).

75. See, e.g., In Re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 542 A2d
770 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d
787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53
(Del. 1989).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/5
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D. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan Inc.76
Mills answered this question. The case involved the sale of MacMillan
through an active bidding process. When faced with a hostile takeover, breakup of the corporation is not inevitable, and Unocal says that defensive
measures instituted to continue the existence of the corporation are acceptable
if reasonable. 7 However, once the decision is made to sell the company,
change in control becomes inevitable, and focus under Unocal shifts to the
Revlon duties to obtain the best possible deal for the shareholders.7 8 If the
directors favor one bid over another, they must show that they reasonably
believed that the shareholder benefitted by such favoritism (a Unocal-type
analysis).79 Again, once these preconditions are met, the business judgment
rule will protect the board.8"
Another question remained: what exactly constitutes a "sale" so that these
duties are triggered?
E. ParamountCommunications Inc. v. Time Inc."1
In this case, Time was planning a strategic merger with Warner
Communication Inc. Paramount made a hostile cash tender offer for Time.
As a result of this hostile effort, Time restructured its merger with Warner
into an acquisition by Warner of a majority of Time's stock.' Paramount
argued that this defensive tactic was an agreement to put Time up for "sale,"
thus triggering Revlon duties to obtain the best possible deal for the
shareholders.' Since the stock of the combined companies would remain
with a large group of fluid, changeable shareholders, the court held that no
"sale" or change of control transaction occurred, and, therefore, the Revlon
duties were not triggered.' The argument shifted to the Unocal analysis,
and the court held that the defensive tactic met that test.8 5

76. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989)
77. Unocal,493 A.2d at 958.
78. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184-85.

79. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1287-88.
80. Id. at 1288.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
Id. at 1143-49.
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1151.
Id. at 1155.
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IV. THE INSTANT DECISION

A. Change of Control Transaction
The Paramount11 court addressed a problem left unanswered in previous
cases: What is the definition of "change of control transaction" which triggers
the Revlon duties? Paramount argued that under Revlon, a break-up of the
company must be inevitable in order to have a change of control

transaction."

Paramount viewed the sale of their stock to Viacom as a

strategic alliance between the two companies.'

Since the company would

continue to be an entity after the sale, Paramount felt that its situation
paralleled the Time-Warner scenario and did not constitute a "sale."
Therefore, the defensive tactics they employed in their agreementwith Viacom
should fall under the Unocalreasonableness standard.
The Delaware Supreme Court disagreed. They specifically stated that a
break-up of a company did not have to occur in order to have a change of
control transaction.' They placed importance on the fact that in TimeWarner, control of the stock would remain in the hands of a large, fluid, and
changing group of stockholders, much like before the transaction." In
contrast, control of a combined Paramount/Viacom entity would rest with one
person, Sumner Redstone of Viacom. This situation would be much different

than in Time/Warner. Since the risk to minority shareholders was greater in
this instance, enhanced judicial scrutiny was necessary." The court held that
the Paramount/Viacom deal was a change in control transaction, thus
triggering Revlon duties.91

B. Enhanced JudicialScrutiny and Breach of Duties
Specifically, the court found that the Paramount directors had four
obligations: (1) to be diligent and vigilant in examining and considering both
the Viacom transaction and QVC's tender offer; (2) to act in good faith; (3)
to obtain and carefully act on all reasonably available information, including
that which was needed to compare the two offers, looking towards what would

86. Paramount1, 637 A.2d at 46. Paramount had reason to believe this, based
upon their experience with Time in Time-Warner. In that case, Paramount lost because
the court held that the acquisition of a majority of Time's stock by Warner was not
a sale. T7me-Warner,571 A.2d at 1151.
87. ParamountI, 637 A.2d at 36.

88. Id. at 47.
89. Time-Warner, 571 A.2d at 1151.
90. Paramount , 637 A.2d at 47.

91. Id. at 48.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/5
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provide the best value to the stockholders; and (4) to actively negotiate in
good faith with both suitors.' In holding that the Paramount directors did
not meet these obligations, the court stated: "We conclude that the Paramount
directors' process was not reasonable, and the result achieved for the
stockholders was not reasonable under the circumstances."' Due to the NoShop Provision, the board was prevented from actively negotiating with other
bidders, thus limiting its ability to gather material information in which to
make an informed decision. Further, the board's failure to eliminate or
modify the counterproductive defensive devices showed that they gave
insufficient attention to the potential consequences of such measures.94
These problems caused the Paramount directors to "squander" any opportunity
to negotiate for the stockholders and to fulfill their duty to secure the best
value reasonably available.95
V. COMMENT
A. Change of Control Transaction-A Clear Definition?
This decision leaves Paramount in a quandry, because it appears that it
lost from both sides of quite similar transactions. In Time-Warner,the court
allowed Time to be sold to Warner without the transaction being defined as

a "change in control" because the sale was made from one large, fluid, and

changing group of stockholders to another.96 When Paramount found itself
in Time's position in its fight with QVC, it logically used the same argument
that Time used against it. Paramount lost again when the court distinguished
Time-Warner, reasoning that control was not going to another large, fluid
group of stockholders; control was going to one person, Sumner Redstone of
Viacom' Why was the latter a change of control while the former was not?
The court explained that in the latter situation, the risk to minority
shareholders was greater.9" It reasoned that if control rests with only one
person, he can more easily and quickly move to the detriment of minority
shareholders.99 If contol rests with a large group of fluid stockholders,

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Time-Warner,570 A.2d at 1151.
Parmnountl,635 A.2d at 1251.
ParamountlI, 637 A.2d at 47.
Id.
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minority shareholders are in no worse position than they were before the
transaction; control, in effect, did not really pass to anyone." 0
However, even if control rests with one person, the court recognized that
minority shareholders were protected by the imposition of fiduciary duty upon
the controlling shareholder.' 1 The court does not explain why this fiduciary
duty is not adequate to protect minority shareholders and why an enhanced
judicial scrutiny doctrine, administered by the courts, offers better protection.
B. Unocal or Revlon: Which Analysis Controls?
The Revlon standard has been described as "a more rigorous Unocal
test."''
The Unocal test has been termed a "reformulated business judgment
rule." °s What does ParamountIT add to the analysis?
As described earlier, the traditional business judgment rule is a
presumption that directors make business decisions in good faith and in the
honest belief that decisions are made with the best interests of the corporation
in mind, based on the conditions that the directors must fully inform
themselves of all material information reasonably available, and they must be
Revlon's pertinent addition to the Unocal framework of
disinterested.'
analysis is that once a change in control becomes inevitable, the best interests
of the corporation are limited exclusively to securing the best value for the
shareholders that is reasonably available."0
ParamountIT adds nothing to the Unocal/Revlon standards of analysis.
Paramount11's importance is as a definitional tool to give a board clearer
guidelines to use in determining which analytical framework (Unocal or
Revlon) controls in a specific situation.
C. Defensive Antitakover Measures-When Can They Be Used?
Certainly, as long as a company is trying to fight off a hostile takeover
where there is no change of control contemplated, Unocalstates that defensive

100. "But here, effectuation of the merger would not have subjected Time
shareholders to the risks and consequences of holders of minority shares. This is a

reflection of the fact that no control passedto anyone in the transaction contemplated."
Id.
101. Id.
102. Kurp, supra note 74, at 40.
103. Brown, supra note 66, at 241.
104. See supranotes 53-56 and accompanying text. See also, generally,Dan L.
Goldwasser and Edward Himmelfarb, The Business Judgment Rule: 1985
Developments, 507 PLI/CoRP 329 (1985).
105. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss3/5
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measures may be employed if reasonable."' However, the question remains
whether defensive tactics can ever be used when Revlon controls.
In Mills, the court held that measures such as lock-ups or no-shop
provisions are not invalid per se as long as they further the bidding process
and enhance the opportunity to advance the interests of the stockholders."0
However, the court in ParamountII stated, "[w]hile we have held that lock-up
options are not per se illegal...no options with similar features have ever been
upheld by this Court."'08 It is difficult to imagine a situation where such
defensive tactics would encourage bidders, thus enhancing the value to the
stockholders. Therefore, in a change of control situation, it appears that any
defensive measures are going to be scrutinized by the courts. 0 9 This means
that the courts will increasingly use their "enhanced judicial scrutiny" doctrine
to review directors' decisions in these areas.
D. The Importance of Characterization
ParamountIlillustrates the importance of correctly characterizingthe type
of transaction involved in the sale of a company, and it also goes a long way
toward defining how the courts will interpret these transactions.
The Paramount board proceeded under the assumption that their actions
would be judged under the Unocal framework. Using that standard of
analysis, a good argument can be made that the board's decisions were
reasonable. However, the board did not count on Revlon controlling; under
that framework, many of its actions were unreasonable. Therefore, it is very
important that a board be able to clearly define what it is trying to do.
One thing that doomed Paramount was its refusal to consider that its
situation had changed dramatically. While it more closely resembled the
Unocal scenario in the beginning, the situation quickly came to resemble
Revlon more closely once QVC entered the picture. As the court noted,
Paramount did not have a procedure in place that would allow it to consider
new information;"0 rather, it developed a "bunker" mentality, refusing to
solicit and consider new information.

106. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
107. Mills, 559 A.2d at 1287.
108. Paramountff,637 A.2d at 51.
109. See, e.g., Randy. Western Air Lines, Inc., 1994 WL 89006 (Del. Ch.); In
Re Holly Farms Corporation Shareholder Litigation, 1988 WL 143010 (Del. Ch.);
Cede and Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).

110. Paramountff,637 A. 2d at 48.
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E. Actions DirectorsCan Take To GuaranteeSatisfaction of
FiduciaryDuties

As discussed earlier, the line of cases from Aronson to ParamountH1
indicate that certain preconditions must be met as a threshold before a board
can claim protection under the business judgment rule. When the court deems
that a change in control transaction exists, the directors have a duty to obtain
the best price possible (Revlon)."' If defensive tactics are employed, they
must be reasonable in that they enhance, rather than hinder, the bidding
process (Unocal)." What can directors do to meet this threshold?
One of the criticisms of the board in ParamountI was that it did not have
an adequate process by which to keep itself fully informed in order to make
a reasoned, well informed decision." 3 Therefore, it appears that one thing
a board must do is to have a reasonable and open process which ensures that
it gets complete, accurate, and timely information upon which to base a
decision." 4
Another problem is the bidding process itself. Once it became clear that
the company was up for sale, Paramount made no effort to modify or
eliminate the defensive measures it negotiated with the favored suitor,
Viacom."' In order to ensure that it meets its fiduciary duties, it appears
that a board must include in its process a way to modify or eliminate any
defensive measures which appear to favor one bidder over another once it
becomes apparent that the measures are hindering the auction process.
VI. CONCLUSION
A board must correctly determine whether Unocal or Revlon controls in
its particular situation. Once this has been decided, the directors will know
which preconditions they must meet in order to survive enhanced judicial

111. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184.
112. Unocal,493 A.2d at 954.
113. Paramountif, 637 A.2d at 50. "When the Paramount directors met on
November 15 to consider QVC's increased tender offer, they remained prisoners of
their own misconceptions and missed opportunities to eliminate the restrictions they
had imposed on themselves." Id.

114. "Directors who have undertaken the responsibility of selling the corporation
must take an 'active and direct role' in the process." Kahn v. Caporella, 1994 WL
89016, *5 (Del. Ch.). See also Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Decisionalintegrityand
The Business Judgment Rule: A Theory, 17 PErP. L. REv. 879 (1990); Morton
Moskin, Trans Union: A NailedBoard, 10 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 405 (1985).
115. Paramount, 637 A.2d at 50.
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scrutiny. Then, a plaintiff must overcome the presumptions of the business
judgment rule in order to set aside the board's decision.
After properly characterizing its transaction, a board's next step would be
to utilize a process which is easily indentifiable as fair, open, and reasonable,
attracting full and complete information, and encouraging a fair and open
bidding process. If it does these things, then a board will likely meet the
threshold requirements outlined in the preceding cases.
Additionally, a board must be able to recognize when circumstances may
dramatically change a situation and it must be willing to modify its position
accordingly. This may include amending or even eliminating any defensive
anti-takeover devices. If these areas are addressed, then a board will likely
enjoy the protection of the business judgment rule, even if its decision later
turns out to be less than optimal, no matter which standard a court may apply.
TERRY M. JARRETT
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